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ABSTRACT
By
using
Interactive computer graphics (ICG) It Is
possible
to
dIscuss
the numerical aspects of some arms
race
Issues with
more specificity and In a visual way.
The
number
of
variables Involved In these Issues can be
quite
large;
computers
operated
In
the
InteractIve,
graphical
mode,
can
allow exploration of the variables,
leadIng
to a greater understanding of the Issues.
This
paper
will
examine some examples of Interactive computer
graphics:
(1) the relationshIp between silo hardenIng and
the
accuracy, ylel d, and reliability of ICBMs; (2) target
vul nerability
(MInuteman,
Dense
Pack); (3) counterforce
vs.
countervalue
weapons; (4) civil defense; (5) gravIt
ational
bias
error; (6) MIRV; (7) national VUlnerability
to
a
preemptive
first
strIke; (8) radioactIve fallout;
(9) digItal Image processIng with charge-coupled devices.
I.

I NTRODUCT I ON

I.A.
Methodologies:
Words,
EquatIons,
Pictures,
and
ICG.
In
spIte of the fact that so much has already
been
written
about the arms race, some general confusion
about the strategic Importance of various mIssile systems
and
strategies
continues.
ThIs
paper
explores the
possibility
of
using
the
vIsual
medium
through
Interactive
computer
graphics
(ICG)
to learn about the
arms
race.
ICG
has
three
distinct
advantages:
(1)
Interactive,
vIsual
educatIon;
(2) debating polley; and
(3) "networking" Information.
We
often
have
been told that "a picture Is worth a
thousand
words;"
the
Interactive pictures of leG may be
Improved medium
for
Increasing our understanding of
an
the
arms
race.
The
computer
can
relate
both to our
logIcal,
mathematical:
left sIde of the brain as well as
to
the more IntuItive rIght side of the brain as has been
IndIcated
by Sperryl and others.
Gradel and McGII1 2 have
pointed
out that
"The
graphical
presentation of the
results
of
complex
computer model
calculations Is
frequently
as
Important
as the computation, since It Is
generally
through such presentatIons that the modeler and
the modeler's
aUdience
derive
the maxImum amount of
Information."
Since
the
deluge of words tn our socIety
has. weakened
the
strength
of
verbal
communIcation,
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numbers have often taken on a greater political power
than they deserve, both because they appear to be more
reliable, and because they are not understood.
ICG can
correct th I s tendency by a I low I ng both s' des to exp lore
and understand the variation In the data sets that are
used to prove the "bottom lIne." Thus, ICG can be used
both for educating and for debating national security
polley.
Of course, there Is a limit to what can be
quantIfied In these debates since the uncertaintIes of
the
arms
race
are
larger
than the certainties;
nevertheless, we should try to be as accessible and
accurate as possible when we do quantify. Lastly, ICG
diskettes can be copied and maIled easily to those who
wish to study and teach numerIcal aspects of the arms
race; this ability to "network" Information adds a new
dimension to printed words and equations.
In this paper we will consider some sImplIfied
models
of "war games" that can be used In Interactive
computer graphics. Most of these results can be obtained
as easily with mathematical
equatIons alone; but our
purpose Is to enhance the transfer of knowledge to those
who are uncomfortable wIth the use of equations.
In our
ICG program "First Strike" (Sec. VI) we will use ninety
adjustable parameters; only with ICG can one keep track
of this plethora of parameters which seem to become
further removed from reality the more we "talk" about
them.
Ultimately
one
can
not use equatIons and
parameters
alone
to
describe the "action-reaction"
esca I at Ion of the arms race and the degree of stab I I I ty
from
mutually
assured destruction (MAD), but these
mathematIcal models do set some limits on what actually
could be done, and they do give some meaningful Insights
Into the Interactions that effect the outcomes of these
difficult Issues.
I.B.
Graphics. Computer graphics Involves a number
of trIcks of the trade: the abIlity to "page-flip"
between the two pages of high-resolutIon graphics; the
use of toggle switches to Input data to the computer; the
abilIty to rapidly scale and rotate shape tables ~or
animation; the use of "Easy Draw" to prepare large
figures such as maps; the scaling and transformation of
Images; the use of
light pens, Joy sticks, graphics
Tablets, and graphics printers; and other processes. An
exce I I ent text on, these graph I cs techn I q ues has been been
written by R. Myers 3 ; those who would like to learn more
about these topics can purchase a diskette with about 70
graphics
programs
that accompany the text.
It Is
Interesting to point out that undergraduate students are
often
more
creative
and
faster
with
developIng
sophisticated graphics than many faculty; perhaps, this
Is because learnIng to use such terminology as peek and
poke are very much I Ike learnIng a new foreign language.
At any rate, perserverance can overcome most graphics
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problems.
Some
of these graphics tricks are highlighted
In
the manual on. ICG which Is avai lable to accompany our
diskette (Sec. XI).
To
demonstrate
the
power
of
interactive computer
graphics,
we
will
exa.mine
the
following Issues In the
sections listed
below:
(II-IV)
Target VUlnerability:
The
tradeoff
between
accuracy,
yield,
hardness,
reliabilIty,
and
grav rtatlonal
bias
error;
Minuteman
vulnerabilIty;
first
and
second
strike weapons; Dense
Pack
MX;
and
civil defense.
(V) Multiple Independently
Targetable
Reentry
Vehicles
(MIRV).
(VI)
Natronal
vulnerability
to
a
preemptive
first
strike;
Is
rt
possible?
(VII)
Distribution of
radIoactive
fallout
after
a nuclear attack.
(VIII) Digital Image processing
to
enhance verIfIcation; the use of charge-coupled device
cameras that can be used directly wIth computers.
II.

TARGET VLlLNERAB IL ITY

We
shall
begin
by considering In detail an example
that
can
be discussed with equations or leG; the example
Is the
case
of an attack on the U.S. MInuteman force by
SovIet
SS-18 mIssiles.
Sec.
II
will
consIder some
equatlons,
Sec.
III will consider ICG, and
Sec. IV will
broaden
the
discussion
to
Include
the
effects of
a
possible gravitational bias error.
I I. A.
Parameters.
I f the accuracy of a miss I I e Is
Increased,
It
follows
that the yield necessary to carry
out
a mission
against a hardened mIlitary target can be
correspondingly
reduced.
As
accuracy
Increased by
a
factor
of
twenty
tram about 5 mIles In 1954 to 1/4 mr Ie
In
1970,
the U.S. decreased the yield of Its warheads by
a factor
of about 100 from 9 megatons (Mt) for the Titan
ICBM to 50 kilotons (kt) for Polaris/Poseidon and 170 kt
for
Minuteman.
Increased
accuracy
was
the necessary
precursor
to the deployment of smaller warheads used with
Multiple
Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV)
for
counterforce
purposes.
The
new
technologies
available to
the
cruise
missile have further Increased
accuracy
to
I ess
than
10m.
The
tradeoff
between
accuracy
and
y IeI d
(for
hardened
targets)
can
be
qualitatively
understood
by
considering the empirIcal
relatlonshlp4
for
blast
over-pressure
derIved from
nuclear testing (surface blasts):

(1)
where
p Is the overpressure In psI, Y Is the yield In Mt,
and
r Is the dIstance In nautical miles (1 nm = 1852 m).
For
the
case
of
a
"51 la-bustIng" attack on Minuteman
where
high
pressures
are needed, one need consider only
the
fIrst
term
r n Eq. 1.
S I nee accuracy Improved by a
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factor of 20 from 1954 to 1970, It follows that the yield
could have been reduced by a factor of (20)3 = 8000 In
order to carry out the same mII I tary miss I on. S I nee the
yIeld was reduced by a factor of only lOa, the additional
effective yield of Minuteman and Polaris/PoseIdon can be
used to overcome hardened mlssl Ie sites and to Increase
the
probabilIty
of
a
successful
mission.
The
mIniaturIzatIon of nuclear weapons has also enhanced the
relative ability to destroy surface area (as well as
point
targets) sInce the total
destructive area (s
Increased (per Mt) wIth a Iarger number of sma I I er
weapons.
II.B
Minuteman VUlnerabIlity.
In order to give
some
fee I I ng for the numbers
Invo I ved In MInuteman
vulnerability,
let us calculateS the single shot kIll
probabilIty (SSKP
P .) for a missile attacking a
k
hardened sIlo:
P = 1 - e-(Y2/3/B CEp2 H213 )
k

(2)

where B:: 0.22 when Y Is In Mt, H Is the sIlo hardne.ss In
psi, and CEP (circular error probable) Is the accuracy In
nm.
We can determine the SSKP of destroyIng a Minuteman
sIlo assumIng the following parameters S - 8 :
(1) Minuteman
s II os are hardened to about H = 2000 ps I; (2) The Russ I an
55-18 warheads typIcally have a yield Y :: 0.75 Mt and a
CEP
280 m (0.15 nm, at some point In the future); and
(3)
The reliabIlity of an SS-18 Is, perhaps, R = 0.8.
UsIng these parameters, the SSKP for the S5-18 on a
MInuteman 5110 Is P k :: 1 - e-1.0S = 1 - 0.35 = 0.65. The
5SKP should be multiplied by the rei labIlity of the 55-18
to obtain the success rate for each 55-18 warhead; we
obtaIn 52% for R :: 0.8, and 59% for R :: 0.9. For the
case of aiming two 5S-18 reentry vehIcles from dIfferent
launchers at a given 5110, the kill probability Is Pk2
(0.48)2:: 77% for R = 0.8 and 83% for R :: 0.9.
1
Because one Incoming warhead can destroy another Incoming
warhead
(the
fratrIcIde
effect), the two Incoming
warheads must arrive less than about 10 seconds from each
other.
For thIs reason we do not have to consider the
case of three or more Incoming warheads; nevertheless,
for the case of 3 Independent 55-18's, the success rate
would be Pk3 = 1 - (0.48)3 = 89% for R :: 0.8. Since
there are 1000 Minuteman mIssiles, these results Imply
that,
perhaps, 170 to 230 would survive two 55-18's, and
100 would survive 3 5S-18's.
The latter case would
consume the entire 5S-18 force since there are about 308
5S-18 launchers and each could be MIRVed about 10 times.
From
this analysIs we can conclude that "MInuteman
vulnerabIlity" means that the U.S. would have between 100
to
250
MInuteman
launchers (200 to 600 warheads)
remaining after a Russian first-strike attack. These
calculatIons
consIder
neIther
the
possIbIlity
of
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systematic
bIas
errors (Sec. IV) nor the other armaments
that are avaIlable to deter such an attack (Sec. VI).
II. C
Dense
Pack.
I t has been proposed to base the
MX mlssl Ie
In a very closely packed matrix (545 m apart)
so
that
IncomIng mlssi les
would
destroy
each
other
(fratricide).
Let
us determine the mInimum value of the
hardness
(H
In
psi)
of the MX silos that would prevent
incoming
warheads of yield Y =: 0.75,1,5, and 25 Mt from
destroying more
than
one
MX
si 10.
Since the nearest
neighbor
spacing
Is 545
m,
an
IncomIng
warhead that
landed
halfway betw.een two silos would be 273 m from each
silo.
Using
the
formula
for overpressure from surface
blasts
(Eq.
1), we obtain the following values: H > 3500
psi
for
0.75 Mt warheads; H > 5000 psi (1 Mt); and H >
22,000
psi
(5 Mt),
and
H > 110,000 psi (25 Mt).
In
addition,
one
must consider the size of the craters from
the sew ar he ads;
1 f ther a diu s 0 f the era t e r 4, 9 I s grea t e r
than
275 m, both silos could be destroyed.
By using the
Rand Corporation
"Bomb
Damage Effect Computer" (1964),
we
have
obtained
the
radl I of the craters In rock: r :::
142
m (0.75 Mt), r::: 158 m (1 Mt), r::: 279 m (5 Mt), and
r
:::
485 m (25 Mt).
These crater rad! I (In rock) can be
approximately
described
by
r
160 Y~3 where r Is In
meters
and
Y Is
In Mt.
By
buIldIng
silos
In more
res II I ent
rock
med I a It is poss I b I e to reduce the effect
of
these
craters
somewhat,
but it Is clear that a very
large warhead
would
create
a
large enough
crater to
destroy
two
MX
sl los.
(There
Is some recent evidence
that
these
crater
radi I
for very large weapons must be
reduced by about a factor of two.)

J

I I.

TARGET VULNERABILITY WITH

ICG

III.A
leG.
The
complexity of
the equations of
Sec.
I I
is
usually
enough to dissuade most people from
movIng
from
a discussion
of the trees (equations) to a
broader
dIscussion of
the forest (stabIlity In the arms
race
as
affected
by
numbers).
To obtaIn a view of the
forest
we
wIll
use
ICG to obtain a "physIcal feel" for
the
parameters
and
equations
dealIng wIth
target
VUlnerabIlIty.
We will briefly descrIbe the ICG program
"Bombs"
which
has five adjustable parameters: yield (Y),
accuracy
(CEP), hardness (H), number of warheads aImed at
a silo
(U, and gravitational bias error (Sec. IV). The
program
"Bombs" assumes 100% reliability for the Incoming
warheads;
I t caul d be
modified
with
a random number
generator
to account
for
less
than 100% reliabilIty.
Bombs
does
the followIng:
It calculates the kill radIus
(rk)
of
a warhead
as
a
function of the yield of the
warhead
and the hardness of the silo; It scatters circles
wIth
a
radius of rk about the aim point wIth an accuracy
of
CEP
usrng
Gaussian
statistics;
It
simulates
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gravItatIonal bIas error by shIftIng the aIm poInt wIth a
Joy stIck; the key "Q" can be used to cal I up the menu to
scale the graphics and to vary Y, CEP, and H.
The program calculates the kill radIus (In nm) of a
surface blast as a functionS of the yIeld of the weapon
and the hardness (H ~ P In Eq. I) of the target;
r

k

=

{Y/(0.068H - 0.23H l/2 +

0.19)}1/3

•

(3)

For example, the kill radius of an SS-18 warhead (0.75
Mt) wl( I vary dependIng on the hardness of the Intended
target:
For a Minuteman 5110 (2000 psI), rk ::: 335 m
(0.18 nm);
for superhardenlng Minuteman to H = 5000 psI
for MX deployment, rk = 245 m (0.13 nm); for a horIzontal
MX (600 psi), rk = 5'-0 m (0.28 nm); for cIties with H = 5
psI, rk;:: 6.7 km (3.6 nm); and for clvll defense with H =
30 psi,
rk = 1.7 km (0.92 nm). Similarly, the kIll
radIus will vary depending on the yIeld of the warhead
that Is aimed at a MInuteman sIlo (H ::: 2000 psi): for Y
::: 0.75 Mt, rk ::: 335 m (0.18 nm), for Y ::: 0.35 Mt (MX), rk
;:: 260 m (0.14 nm); and for Y = 0.1 Mt <TrIdent), rk = 170
m (0.093 nm).
In FIgure 1, the computer graph"lcs has
drawn the circles associated with these kIll radiI.
The
accuracy
of
the
Incoming
missIles
Is
Incorporated Into the program In the fol lowIng way: The
program assumes that the IndIvidual mIssiles are randomly
spread
about the aIm point with a normal GaussIan
distribution;
(4)

with cr = CEP/l.17.
This Implies no systematic bias
error; the dIstribution Is centered about the arm point
at r
O.
The program does Its calculation on a
rewrrtten form of Eq. 4 to obtaIn the random radius for
this Gaussian distribution,
rCrandom)

1 2

:=

-

(2 / cr) In(Rnd)

(5)

where Rnd Is a random number between 0 ann 1 generated by
the computer.
In addItIon, the program assumes random
angles for the missiles wIth respect to the aim poInt.
WIth these assumptions, "Bombs" can graph the case of
SS-18 (Y = 0.75 Mt) aimed at Minuteman sl los (H = 2000
pst) with an accuracy of CEP
0.15
nm = 280m (In
1985?).
For the case of 100 Independent 55-18 warheads
falling on Minuteman, "Bombs" calculates (see FIg. 2)
that
30 missiles survive and that 70
missiles are
destroyed.
This Is statIstIcally consIstent with Eq. 2
whIch IndIcates that 35% of the MInuteman force would
survIve an attack of one $S-18 of 100$ reliability on one
sIlo.
In 1981 and 1983 the U.S. government has proposed
placing the MX missile In superhardened Minuteman silos
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FIg.
1.
KILL
RAD'II:
The kill radius of a mIssIle Is a
functIon
of the yIeld (Y) of the missile and the hardness
(H)
of
the sIlo (Eq. 3).
The dots In the figure are 0.2
nautIcal
mIles
(1
nm;:: 1852 m) apart, and the matrIx of
dots
is
1.6
nm (1.85 miles) on a sIde.
For the case of
the 55-18 mIssIle (y .. 0.75 Mton) the ICG program "Bombs"
has
drawn
the
following
cIrcles:
(1) H = 2000 psI for
the
MInuteman
sIlo,
(2)
H
5000
psI
for
the
superhardened
MInuteman
silo,
(3)
H = 600 psI for the
horIzontal
MX missIle,
and (4) H" 30 psI for the urban
area
with clv II defense.
For norma I urban areas of H ;:: 5
psi,
the
kl II radIus Is offscale sInce It Is 3.6 nm (6.7
km
4.2
miles).
For
the case of the MInuteman sl los
wIth
H ;::
2000. circles have been drawn for (1) Y = 0.75
Mton
(55-18).
(5)
Y;:: 0.35 Mton for the MX mIssIle, and
(6)
Y = 0.1 Mton for the TrIdent submarIne.
The cIrcles
appear e I I I pt 1ca I I n shape because of the App I e graph J cs.

=

FIg.
2.
HARDENED MINUTEMAN
SILOS:
The
patfern
of
mIssiles
Is
dIstrIbuted about the aIm point according to
GaussIan
statIstIcs
(Eq.
4).
In the upper portIon of
this
figure
we
have
consIdered the
case of the 55-18
missile
(Y
;::
0.75 Mton) with a cIrcular error probable
accu.racy
of
CEP ;:: 0.15
nm (perhaps, In 1985?) on the
MInuteman
silos
(H ;:: 2000 psI).
In this example, 5 of
the 7
sl los
were destroyed under the assumptIon of 100%
rei lability
for
the 55-18.
The same parameters are used
In
the
lower portIon of the fIgure (Y ;:: 0.75 Mton, CEP ;::
0.15
nm). but the MInuteman silos have been hardened to H
= 5000 psi; 4 of the 7 miss! les were successful (with
100%
reliability).
If
the reliability of the S5-18 had
been 85%, only 6 of the 7 mIssiles would have landed.
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Fig. 2 HARDENED MINUTEMAN SiLOS:
(Capt ion on prevIo us page)

Fig. 3.
U.S. COUNTER-FORCE WEAPONS: (A) The MX missi
(Y
0.35 Mton, CEP = 0.05 nm) Is aimed at sf los with Hle=
2000 psi; the small er, but very accur ate MX could
be used
as a first- strik e weapo n.
(B) The Tride nt I missi le (V ;;;
0.1 Mton) may have modes t accur acy (midd le of figure
0.1 Mton, CEP = 0.25 nm), or ee) the Tride nt II may , Y =
a very good accur acy (botto m of figure ; CEP = 0.1 have
nm).
The forme r case of 0.25 nm could Imply a secon
d-stri
role again st urban targe ts (or a first strik e again ke
st an
airfie ld), while the later case of 0.1 nm could
Imply a
first- strIk e role again st Sovl. t sIlos .
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by I ncreas I ng H from 2000 ps I to 5000 psi. The ICG
display
In Fig. 2 shows that the consequence of thIs
These results are
Improvement
are not very great.
consistent
with
the calculation of the SSKP which
decreases from 65% for 2000 psi to 44% for 5000 ps i for
the case of R = 1.0.
III.B
Counter - Force Weapons. Figure 3 shows quIte
graphIcally that the MX missile (Y = 0.35 Mt, CEP = 100 m
= 0.05 nm,
and Iet us assume H = 2000 ps I for Sov let
silos)
Is a counterforce weapon that could destroy a
hardened target In a first-strike attack.
In spIte of
the fact that the MX has a smaller yield than the 5S-18
<0.35 Mt/O.75 Mt ~ 50%), Its greater accuracy (0.05
nm/0.15 nm
1/3) al lows the MX to have a consIderably
larger SSKP (99%) than the SS-18 (65%). Figure 3 shows
that the Trident
I submarine (Y = 0.1 Mt) would not be
used as a first-strike weapon If Its CEP = 0.25 nm
because of
Its minimal kill ability, but that (depending
on the hardness of the target) the Trident I I could be a
first-strike weapon If Its CEP = 0.1 nm or less.
III.C
Civil
Defense.
Lastly, one can examIne the
ability of warheads to destroy cities (H = 5 psi).
In
FIgure 4 the leG plot of a "random" attack by 5S-18
warheads Indicates that one warhead of 3/4 megaton can
easily destroy (rk = 6.7 km) the city In the figure (3 km
by 3 km).
If a civil defense polley Is established to
harden shelters wIth H = 30 psi,
leG shows that the
hardened urban targets are stili destroyed (rk = 1.7 km).
The hardening of cities Is very difficult; hence the
Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
(FEMA)
Is
establishing
controversial evacuatIon plans for U.S.
cIties.

Fig.
4.
buildings

CIVIL DEFENSE:
TypIcal
In
urban areas have a
hardne~s
of H = 5 psi; the S5-18 (Y =
0.75 Mton) can easily destroy large
areas (top of figure; rk = 6.7 km;
circles seperated for visualization
and a scale factor of 1:10). Using
ha r den ed, c I v I Ide fen s e .5 he I t e r s (H =
30 psi) doesn't effectively mitigate
the situatIon (bottom of figure; rk =
1.7 km; circles seperated wIth CE'P =
1 nm and a scale factor of 1:2).

~
00
Y=O.75
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IV. MiSSiLE ACCURACY AND GRAVITATIONAL BIAS ERROR
The Issue of "bIas error" In ICBM targetIng has been
raised recentlyIO; It has been suggested that systematic
errors from gravitational uncertaintIes may reduce the
accuracies of US/USSR missiles so that they may not
attarn their stated accuracies for trajectorIes over the
po Ies.
(Th I s I naccuracy Is probab Iy Iess than the
uncertainty In the listed aIm poInt.) This reductIon In
accuracy could result because the ICBM's would experience
a
dIfferent
gravitational
field
for
bal I Istlc
trajectorIes over the poles (which are not tested) as
compared to the trajectory to ~wajaleln Atol I (which Is
often tested); the uncertainties In correcting for the
dl fferent "g" force for the pol ar trajectory (as well as
other gravitational shifts) might shift the "aim point"
away from the Intended target In an undeterminable way.
The Executive Branch has Indicated that the bras errors
are
Included In the lIsted accuracies of the ICBM's.
However,
It Is Important to consider the Issue of
gravitational bias since It questions whether eIther sIde
cou I d ever have conf I dence I nits ab III ty to successf uII y
carry out a preemptIve first strike. We wIll not be able
to determine the uncertainties caused by these bIas error
correct Ions; however, we wII I s Imu I ate b I as error with
leG In order to graphically describe the problems.
In order to avoid the mathematIcal compllcatlons l l
from an ICBM's Keplerl?!n elliptIcal trajectory, let us
conslder 7 the trajectory of an ICBM that follows a
parabo I Ic path above a large f Iat earth.
S I nee the
earth's polar radius of 6357 km Is 21 km (0.3%) smaller
than
Its equatorial radius of 6378km, we should expect
different "g" values for the polar trajectory as compared
to the trajectory to the U.S. mIssile target at KwaJaleln
Atoll.
In the normal three dimensIonal problem one would
consider the earth to be made up of a variety of
"mul tlpolar"
shaped
mass objects (hamburger shaped,
oblate spheroidal, etc.), and then apply Newton's second
law to a complicated force function which described this
nonspherlcal,
multipolar earth.
We shall allow our
pedagogIcal earth to be flat In order to estImate the
uncertainty In the range
x = v 2 sln(28)/g
(6)
that Is caused by the uncertainty ~g In the dIfferent
gravitational
field of an untested trajectory.
The
uncerta r nty I n the range wII I be
~X/X

= 2(~v/v)

+ 2(68/tan(28»

- ~g/g.

(7)
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The difference In g between trajectorIes over the
pole
and
along
the
equator can be approximately
determined from the ratio of the mass In the bulge (6M)
of
the earth to the mass of the earth (M).
For
trajectories which stay reasonably close to the earth
(within about 1000 mIles), we can crudely approxImate
bg(g ~ 6M/M.
Since ~R/R = 0.3% = 10- 3 , we can expect 12
approximately that ~g/g ~ bM/M $ 10- 3 •
From this we see
that the potential
uncertainty In the ICBM flight 3 path
from an uncorrected gravitational bias error (10- ) 15
considerably
larger than the uncertaInty In the range due
to uncertaintIes In velocity and angles which are about
10- 5 == (0.1
km/10,000 km).
Thus,
It Is clear that
grav I tatl ona I correct Ions (due to a nonspher Ica I Earth,
local gravity anomalies,
and the Earth's rotation) must
be made for polar traJectories; the only question Is the
degree of accuracy with whIch one must be able to perform
these corrections in 'order to reduce the uncertaInty In
pg(g to better than 10- 5 •
Since neither the US, nor the
USSR will be allowed to test the quality of their
calculations with
ICBM launches over the pole to the
territory of the other side, a government would have to
believe that their aerospace experts are capable of
measurements
and
calculations
with better than 1%
accuracy In the correctIon for the 9 for~es In order to
have any kind of confidence that a strike on land-based
miss! Ie sl los would have any chance of success.
ICG can
be used to II I ustrate these effects; I n Figure 5 we have
simulated
a substantial
gravitational bIas error by
shiftIng the pattern of cIrcles from the aim point with
the "joy stick" of the computer.
In this figure we have
set the magnItude of the bias error equal to 0.3 nm In
both the x and y directions. Since the magnitude of the
total bias error In this example Is 0.45 nm (or three
times the CEP of 0.15 nm used In this ICG example) all of
the mIssiles (In this fIgure) missed the target. The
actual magnitude of the Inaccuracy In the bias error
correction
Is
less
than
this
fIgure,
but
ICG
descrIptIvely
Indicates how small the bias error has to
b~ In order to neglect Its consideratIon.

~G{G EllA!:!:

q:P=O·15

x= p.7!?
.H=.2090

Fig.
5
GRAVITATIONAL BIAS ERROR:
Corrections for dIfferent trajectorIes
(6g/g - 10- 3 ) must be carrIed out to
about 1%
If the bias error Is not to
~_degrade
the CEP of missiles (CEP/Range
.~.,
,
.,
10- 5 ) .
In Fig. 5, the aim point of
,
. . the
58-18 (Y = 0.75 Mt, CEP == 0.15 nm,
H = 2000 ps r) was moved from the s I 10
with a very large bias error of 0.4 nm
with the "joy stick" of the computer.

~=\,=O,3

,
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V. MIRV/ASW
Inth I s s e c t Ion we wI I I br ref I y des c rIb e tw 0 ICG
programs that were deve loped by Kent Norv I I I e, a stu dent
In my class on the arms race; these programs on MIRV and
ASW
(anti-submarIne
warfare)
are
Intended
to be
provocatIve "teaching tools" rather than sophisticated
"polley making tools."
The MIRV technology
Is capable of spreadIng Its
IndIvIdual warheads over a dIstance of about 1000 km; the
actual
calculation
of
the
ellIptIcal,
ballIstIc
trajectorIes of the reentry vehicles can be approximated
as a shift In the range and tracking position from the
orIgInal ballistIc trajectory. In order to sImplify the
mathematics,
the
program
uses
the
"flat
earth"
approxImation (F1g. 6) for the ballIstIc proJectl1 es; the
program allows the user to vary the number of reentry
vehicles, and theIr IndIvidual velocities (magnItude and
angle) wIth respect to the bus. This approach allows
only a varIatIon In the range dIrection, and not the
trackl,ng
directIon;
nevertheless, this approach has
assisted
those students who are unfamll lar wIth MIRV to
understand
It
more
completely •

km

1000-

.' .,' .... ,\':.~. , .... "
........ \ ....
"
",

":.
':.

. . ' ..

'" ':
'.2'. '.

.... ~
dl

o

5000

10,000 km

Fig. 6.
MIRV: The equatIons for the "flat earth" (Sec.
IV)
are
used
to obtaIn the trajectories for the
IndivIdual reentry vehIcles and the mIssIle bus. An
InItIal velocIty of 10 4 m/s Is used for the ICBM. The
number of reentry vehicles and their velocItIes and
angles (In range only) can be varIed In the program.
Momentum Is conserved In the system as the reentry
vehIcles are released.
The range, height and spread In
range for the re-entry veh I cl es from the IIf I at earth"
calculations are very sImIlar to those for the actual
"round earth."
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The leG program "ASW" applies an ASW technology that
determines the position of a submarine by comparing the
time delays of signals reflected from a submarine to
several
hydrophones;
more
recent technologles 13 use
sonobuovs that transmit and receIve their own sonar
signals,
Infrared observations from satellites, FourIer
transform I ng
sonar
sIgna I s,
Iasers,
and
other
technologIes.
The "ASW" program stimulates consideration
of these more modern technologies as well as makIng clear
the uniqueness of the ocean-going leg of the triad.
VI.

FIRST STRIKE

The qu estion of vUlnerability to a first-strike Is
continually being debated. The Issue of "VUlnerability"
usually means "will we have enough nucl ear weapons to
assure destruction on those who would attack us." The
debates on this Issue often use words I Ike "superiority,
parity and sufficiency."
In spite of the fact that the
uncertainties In first-strike situations are likely to be
greater than the certainties, both sides In this debate
do use numerical data to buttress their arguments. (For
example,
It
would
be
dIfficult
to quantify the
uncertainty In the command, control, and communications
systems caused by the electromagnetic pulse.)
If
one chooses to answer these questions with
numbers and equations, one soon learns that the size of
the data base, and the complexity of the manipulations,
reqUires a computer; It Is for this reason that we have
developed
the
program "First-Strike."
This program
analyzes the strategIc balance by letting us vary 90
adjustable parameters to explore how the many parameters
affect the question of vul nerability. Each side (America
= A and Russia = R) has a 6 by 6 matrix of parameters to
describe their weapon systems. The matrix formulation Is
merely a way of keeping track of the parameters; we do
not use matrix algebra.
Three data'sets (the present,
the future without arms control, and the future wIth arms
contro I) are J nc I uded with the program. Tab I e I shows
the A and R matrices as they approximately appear at the
present time (1980-85):
Table

I.

The A and R matrices for the present time
The rows are the 6 different mlssl Ie classes
(land, sea, air, Intermediate range ballistic missile,
tactl ca I weapons, and cru I se miss II e). The co I umns are
the average values of the param~ters which describe each
system (yield, average number of reentry vehicles per
launcher, number. of launchers, circular error probable
accuracy
(nautical
miles),
reliabilIty (0-1), sIlo
hardness (ps r».
(1980-85).
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AMERICAN A MATRIX
I=Y

2=M

I=LANO

.335

2.1

2=SEA

.1

8

3=AIR

(198571)

3=N 4=CEP 5=R

6=H

1052

,12

.8

2000

656

.25

.8

5
3

346

.1

.8

4= IRBM

.1

1500

.1

.8

5=TAC.

.02

20000

.1

.8

6=CM

.2

1000

.01

.8

4

RUSSIAN R MATRIX
I=Y

2=M

,75

3.2

.5

2

3=N 4=CEP 5=R

6=H

1398

.15

.7

2000

950

.5

,7

5

156

.1

.8

3

.1

4500

.1

.8

5

5

.02

10000

.1

.8

5

0

4

0

0

.01

0

0

T~ls
data set can be updated easily to account for
changes In the parameters. For example, we mIght want to
take Into account ~hat the 52 Titan ICBM's are beIng
decommIssioned; by typing 1,3 (row,column), and 1000., we
w11 I have changed the number of Amer I can
I and-based
mI S5 II es from 1052 to 1000. I f we are content w' th the
data set, we would type 0,0 to accept It. One can easrly
take Issue with the averagIng process that we have used;
for examp Ie, we· have proper', y taken I nto account the
MIRVing of MInuteman (II, and II') by using M = 2.1, but
we have further assumed that they wi I' have an average
yield
comparable to the Mark 12-A warheads of 335
kilotons.
The main point of "FIrst-StrIke" Is to create
a method of changing the parameters as one discusses (and
updates) the data base; after the data base Is acceptable
to the debators, the numer.Jcal operations can be carried
out.
In addition, there are other parameters whIch deal
wIth the number of warheads sent to attack a sf 10 (l),
gravItatIonal bias error (BE = CEP(wlth)/CEP(wlthout)),
submarIne duty factor, effectlvness of ASW, and varIous
other parameters.
One can examine the one-on-one match-ups between
varIous systems by calculatIng the single shot kl I I
probabr r lty <P In Section") with reliabIlity (Tk ;;; R x
Pk), and then the kIll probabIlity with L warheads (from
separate m l s s l l e s ) ' L

Kl

P

;;; 1 -

(1 - T )

k

(8)

After we have examIned these InItial one-to-one results,
"First StrIke" matches up the land-based mIssIles agaInst
each other.
In the example discussed below we have used
2 warheads (l = 2) against each 5110.
In the next
versIon
of this program, we Intend to add further
f I exab II It I ssG to a I low
any sy stem to attack any other
system, to allow for the attack of cIties, and to allow
for a "launch on warnIng" situation and other operational
factors.
We have allowed for broad uncertal ntlesln "FIrst
StrIke" by allowing for fractIonal (0-1) parameters; for
our "base case"we have used the followIng:
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FSUB = submarine duty factor = 0.6 for A; 0.2 for R.
FASW = effectiveness of ASW = 0.5 for A and R.
FIRBM = FTACTICAL = FCRUISE = FBOMBER
= fractions destroyed = 0.5 and 0.5 for A and R.
It would not be difficult to show that all the parameters
(other than FSUB) should be smaller than 0.5; thus, the
destructiveness of the results from "First Strike" are
actually
an
upper
bound estimate.
The number of
surviving
launchers are merely the products of the
appropriate fractional
probabIlitIes and the number of
launchers, except for the case of an attack on the
land-based missiles where we have used the probability
formulation from Eq. 2 and 8. The resultant numbers of
remaining warheads after a first strIke were obtained
from the base case of the "present" data set and they are
displayed
In Fig. 7. We see that approximately 50% (an
upper bound) of the first triad (land/sea/air) and the
second
triad (IRBM/tactlcaJ/crulse mlssl Ie) would be
destroyed 14 1f either side should be tempted to carry out
such a scenario. SInce the number of warheads surviving
wou I d
be
rather
I arge,
there
Is st II I a large
second-strike force to retaliate. SInce the fractional
probabilities are not certain; debators can change these
parameters on the next run of the program.
"First
Strike" also keeps track of the total yield, lethality
(K), and the num bers of
launchers before and after.
~~

2

6

I

I

7

I

f

US

f

SU

I

f

US

I

I
f

SU

FIRST TRIAD

SECOND TRIAD

(LAND/SEA/AIR)

(IRBMITACTICAL/CRUISE MISSILE)

Fig. 7.
FIRST STRIKE:
The number of US/USSR warheads
are compared before and after a "fIrst strIke." The
present (1980-85) data base and the parameters described
In the text were used to obtain these results.
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VII.

FALLOUT.

If a nuclear attack ever occurred, there would be
radIoactive plumes extending from the target points. The
ICG program "Fallout" calls up a map of the United States
(Fig. 8) and al lows the user to locate the targets and
the number of weapons used on each. Parallelograms are
used to simulate the more complex shape~5 of the plumes;
the area of the para I I e Iograms agree with the more
accurately calculated
affected areas by about 25%. The
final shapes for the plumes are highly dependent on the
wInd velocities; our ICG program allows for two dIfferent
wInd velocItIes, 20 mph and 60 mph where the later Is
approximately 50% of the stratospheric velocity. Two
plumes are located at each target; the Inner plume
represents
a
minimum dose of 1350 REM outside of
buildIngs and 450 REM InsIde the bull dIng; the outer
plume represents 450 REM outsIde and 150 REM Inside.
These dose levels would vary consIderably within the
plumes and within the buildings.
A radiation dose of
about 450 REM would kill about 50% of the population.
The present version of this program does not determIne
the number of fatalities; a future version will Include
population densIty and a biological coupling factor In
order to do this even though there would be great
uncertaInties In the absolute numbers of fatalities.

o

...

1/)-

Fig. 8.

FALLOUT:

(FIgure caption on next page.)
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Fig. 8.
FALLOUT: Four different attacks are considered
with "Fallout;" (1) one megaton weapon (50% fission), (2)
10 one megaton weapons, (3) 300 one megaton weapons wIth
a wInd velocIty of 20 mph, and (4) 300 one megaton
weapons with a wfnd velocIty of 60 mph (about 50% of
stratospheric velocity).
The Inner plume represents an
area In which a minimum dose of 1350 REM Is receIved for
those who are outside of buildings, and a minimum dose of
450 REM InsIde of buIldings; the outer plume represents
an area with a dose of 450 REM outside and 150 REM
InsIde.
The
bases
attacked
are
(1)
Ellsworth
(x=82,Y=50), (2) Malmstrom (55,28), (3) Warren (78,67),
and (4) WhIteman (115,85).
VIII.

DIGITAL IMAGE PROCESSING.

In order for the Senate to ratify an arms control
agreement,
It must have confidence In Its "national
technIcal means" to verify that the various conditions of
t~e
treaty
are being upheld by the other party.
Ultimately, the Senate must decide how likely It would be
that the other party could carry out a sIgnificant
Infraction (In terms of national security) before we
could discover the Infraction.
One of main techniques
for verification Is photography from spy satellites. The
InformatIon In the photographic Images can be enhanced by
digItIzing
the
Intensity
at varIous regIons of a
photograph; the dlgltlzatlon Is fol lowed by mathematIcal
operatlons 16
on the dIgital
InformatIon In order. to
enhance the signal with respect to the background noise.
More recently
It has become possfble to directly process
the electronic output of a charge-coupled device (CCD)17
wIthout the necessity of using film; the CCD devIces a~e
much more efficient than film, have a broader spectral
range (Into the Infrared), and can be used directly wIth
computers without reqUirIng digItizing that Is needed for
fIlm.
.In additIon the CCDs are preferable to vidIcon
televIsIon
techniques
since
they
can have better
resolutIon, can be operated with low voltages, and are
more
resIlient
under Impact.
Some commercial CCDs
contaIn 640,000 regions (pIxels) of dIgital InformatIon;
a p) xe I reg Ion can be about 15 mIcrons on a s I'de. CCD
cameras
are presently commercIally available (MIcron
Techno logy, 80 I se, Idaho for about $300) that can be used
wIth Apple computers (54,000 pixels). The techniques of
digItal
Image processing (DIP) have been used In a wide
var Iety of ap p I I cat Ions beyond ver I f Icat Ion such as In
astronomy, medIcine, geology, and criminology.
On ba I ance, the "spy sate I I Ites" and DIP are thought
to be stabl I Izlng for the arms race because they (1)
enhance verIfIcation grvlng greater confidence to the
SALT/START process, and (2) because more Information from
satel lites
can
reduce
the ten~ency towards "worst
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possible case analysis." Some Senators objected to SALT
II
because of the loss of verification facilities In
Iran.
PresIdent Jo~nson made the comment In 1967 when he
Indicated that the $35-40 bIllion spent on space was
worth It because "I know how many miss J I es the enemy
has."
ThIs section of our paper wIll do the followIng:
(1)
BrIefly dIscuss some' mathematical applications of
DIP, and (2) demonstrate some Inltral results of ceo with
Apple computers.
In Fig. 9 we have created a one
dimensIonal silo (20 pIxels wide) that Is partially
blurred
by
noIse
developed
from a random number
generator.
When the signal-to-noise ratIo (SIN) Is very
h r gh, one
does not' need to process th e data to see the
silo, but when the SiN ratio Is less than one It becomes
necessary to process the Image In order to be able to
"see" the silo.
In Fig. 9, we have subtracted the Image
from a versIon of the same Image that has been shIfted by
1 to 20 pixels.
This teChnIque allows us to examine the
data for an auto-correlation within the data; If we
expect the silo to be 20 pixels wide, we would look for a
fIgure that looks lIke a square wave wIth a wavelength of
40
pixels.
In order to work with lower SiN ratios, one
could then FourIer analyze the difference Image and look
for FourIer components consIstent wIth the size of the
s o.
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Fig. 9. DIGITAL IMAGE
PROCESSING:
A random
generator
Is
number
used to partIally mask
a
missile silo with
SiN ratIos between 16
and 1/4. The 5110(20
pixels
wide) can be
discovered with autocorrelation technIques
by
subtracting
the
data from the original
data after shIftIng It
by 1 to 20 pIxels.
If
the resulting data was
FourIer analyzed, one
wou'd obtaIn a strong
component
wIth a 40
pixel wavelength.

202
Atn)
SIN

=8

~~
~~

Fig. 10.
FOURIER TRANSFORM:
The spatial data can be
Fourier analyzed to obtain
Its fequency spectruril; by
reversing the process the spatial representation can be
reestabl (shed.
The sIlo appears more clearly when only
the 4 lowest frequency components are used and the 46
higher components containing the "noise" are rejected.

SIN

=

1

Aln)

SIN =1/4

Fig.
11.
SiN
RATIO.
The
approach of Fig. 10
successfully Identifies a silo with a SiN of 1/4. Two
dimensIonal transforms woul d use the geometry of the 5110
to Improve the results.
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Another
approach
of DIP Is to FourIer Transform the
digital
Information
of
the
Image,
remove the
high
frequency components
that are assocIated with the noise,
and
then
Fourier
transform
the remaining low frequency
(/ong wClvelength)
signal
back to the spatial Image.
By
analyzing
the
data
we convert
It
from
a spatial
representation
to a freqency spectrum; the second Fourier
transform then
synthesizes
(reconstructs)
the
spatial
Image from the truncated frequency spectrum.
In Fig. 10,
we have obtained a 101 pixel array In one dimension from
the
equatIon
y '"
(NN)(Rnd{l» + S where NN Is the peak
noise and S Is the Intensity of the signal.
The Image In
Fig.
10 has a favorable slgnal-to-nolse ratio of SiN
S/(NN/Z)
= 8; when this Image Is FourIer analyzed, one
obtains
large
components
In the
low
frequency region
which
Is assocIated
wIth
the 5110
sIgnal,
and small
components
at
the
hIgh
frequency
regl0n
whIch
is
assocrated
with
random
noise.
When
the
Image
Is
reconstructed
from these components, we observe that only
the 4
lowest
components
are necessary to eas I I y detect
the
5/10,
and
that a greater number of components tends
to
blurr the
reconstructed
Image.
In Fig. 11 we have
Increased the
noise level to give SiN'" 1/1 and 1/4; the
reconstructed
images
with
the
lowest
four
components
clearly
show
The
location
of the 5110.
These examples
must next be extended
to the regime of two dimensions;
the
convo I ut I on
theorem must be
app I I ed to
remove
dIstortion
by
the
Viewing system.
Other transforms can
be
used
In order to apply
mathematics
that
Is more
"tailor-made" to the geometry of the object.
FInally, we
have obtained
some grey level presentations of pIctorial
Images
by
using
a charge-coupled
device, an optlcRAM
wIth 128 x 256
pIxels.
The grey levels In the fInal
pICTure are obTained
by
comparing
Images
of the same
object that were obtained with different exposure times.
Since the
cost can
be as
low as 3 cents/pixel, It is
cl ear that the CCD
techno! ogy 11'1 J I
have a tremendous
Impact on verification and dlgltlal Image processsing.

=

IX.

THE SCIENCE AND SOCIETY PUBLIC POL ICY DISKETTE

A diskette and
manual
of 15 programs Is available
from us
(553
Serrano,
San
L u r 5 Ob I spo, CA 93401) on a
nonprofit,
noncopyrlght
basis
for
$10.
Please send us
your resulTS
for
possible Inclusion on future diskettes
so that we can
create an Imformatlon network.
I would
like to thank James Hauser, Fred Jaquln, Alan Lyon, Kent
NorvIlle,
Dietrich
Schroeer,
and
Walt WIlson
for
assistance on this project.
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